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Studying like a communist: Affect, the Party, and the educational limits to 
capitalism 
 
Derek R. Ford 
DePauw University 
 
In an effort to theorize educational logics that are oppositional to capitalism, this article 
explores what it means to study like a communist. I begin by drawing out the tight 
connection between learning and capitalism, demonstrating that education is not a subset 
but a motor of political-economic relations. Next, I turn to the concept of study, which is 
being developed as an educational alternative to learning. While studying represents an 
educational challenge to capitalism, I argue that there are political limitations to studying 
for which we need to account. Specifically, studying is not in itself political, but only 
represents the possibility of politics. To make this claim and to address these limitations, 
I turn to Jodi Dean’s work on the communist Party. Dean posits the Party not as a master, 
director, or prophet, but as an infrastructure of affective intensity that maintains a gap in 
the order of things. I show that the Party is one way to organize and to defend study. 
Throughout the article, I illuminate the ways in which educational philosophers can 
contribute to political movement building by showing, developing, and refining the 
educational components of politics that many organizers and theorists neglect. 
 




Within the abundance of educational literature on neoliberalism—most of which is 
concerned with issues of curriculum and policy—a provocative and insightful 
philosophical exploration has emerged concerning the educational logic of neoliberal 
capitalism.1 This conversation begins with the important observation that capitalism, as a 
social, economic, and biopolitical regime is legitimated and reproduced through the logic 
of learning. If we want to disrupt and combat capitalism, then, we need to not only 
understand the logic of learning, but also to formulate and enact alternative educational 
logics. Studying has been proposed as one such logic that is attracting the attention of 
educational philosophers (e.g., Ford, 2016a; 2016b; Harney & Moten, 2013; Lewis, 2013; 
Rocha, 2015). This research has provided insights into the ways in which there are 
educational limits to capitalism. But, as I argue in this paper, it has not yet acknowledged 
the ways in which there are political limits to studying. In other words, the leap from 
alternative educational logic to oppositional educational logic has not yet been taken. The 
purpose of this article is to inaugurate this leap. More precisely, the problem that I 
identify is that studying, as heretofore theorized, only provides the opening for politics, 
and thus remains trapped in what Jodi Dean (2016) refers to as the “beautiful moment” of 
the crowd. To become a political force against capitalism, I contend, studying has to be 
theorized in relationship to political organization. 
 I begin this project by drawing out the connection between learning and 
capitalism, demonstrating why learning is so pivotal for the reproduction and 
maintenance of capitalism’s hegemonic grip and, therefore, why it is an important target 
for developing counter-hegemonies. Seen in this light, education does not follow from 
but plays a key role in producing the political-economic order. I next move to an 
elaboration of studying, drawing primarily on the work of Tyson E. Lewis. Studying here 
is not positioned against learning writ large, but rather as a type of ellipses within 
learning, as an act that opens education up to the possibility that things might be radically 
otherwise. To draw out what I call the present political limits of study, I turn to Dean’s 
recent book, Crowds and Party. Dean argues that the crowd event produces a discharge 
of equality that introduces a gap in the present order. Reading Dean through Lewis, I 
draw out how studying is the educational logic of the crowd. While the inauguration of 
the gap of possibility that the study of the crowd generates is necessary for politics, it is 
not sufficient. To back this up, I refer to two examples of radical study: hacking and 
Occupy Wall Street. Taken together, these examples reveal that because studying lacks 
direction and infrastructure, it can be reabsorbed within the dynamics of capital 
accumulation or cut short through state repression. Dean offers a corrective that I suggest 
educational philosophers should take seriously: the Party. For Dean, the Party is not a 
master, director, or prophet, but rather a type of affective infrastructure that maintains the 
gap of possibility and that, as I suggest, organizes and defends study, even in the direst 
and seemingly hopeless of circumstances. 
 
The educational limits to capitalism 
 
If capitalism is predicated upon the dispersion of learning throughout society, then the 
logic of learning represents a crucial educational limit to the reproduction of capitalist 
social, economic, and biopolitical relationships, or what I will collectively refer to as 
“production relations.” Employing a Foucauldian analysis, Maarten Simons and Jan 
Masschelein (2008) have argued that the formation of a “learning apparatus” has been 
central to the rise of neoliberal governmentality. Governmentality refers to the tethering 
together of the state, the economy, and processes of subjectification. It is, in essence, “the 
field of action that compels the individual to act by facilitating an internalization (or 
subjectification) of rationalities or ‘regimes of truth’ that emanate from legal, health, or 
educational apparatuses of the state” (Pierce, 2013, p. 13). Governmentality weds 
together government and self-government, politics and subjectivity—and learning is the 
fulcrum.  
Simons and Masschelein (2008) make four points to demonstrate the centrality of 
the learning apparatus in contemporary society. They first argue that learning has become 
the main engine of the economy, which is variously conceived of as the knowledge, 
information, or creative economy. Not only is education subjected to economics (which is 
what most critiques of neoliberalism focus on), but education itself is a “supplier” of the 
knowledge economy. Workers have knowledge, but they can always gain more 
knowledge. This leads to the second supporting claim, which concerns the emergence of 
“lifelong learning.” Because of the constantly changing nature of the economy and 
society, we have to continually subject ourselves to learning in order to fit the needs of 
global capital and to continually attain happiness, satisfaction, and health. The school, on 
this model, teaches people how to learn so that they can enter adulthood, which is where 
one never stops learning. Moreover, adulthood—true, autonomous being—is defined by 
one taking responsibility for one’s own learning, and this is the third aspect of the 
learning apparatus. “Learners,” in this perspective, “should become the ‘managers’ of 
their own learning, for example, by developing their own learning strategy, monitoring 
the process, and evaluating the results” (p. 400). The fourth point is that today the results 
of learning have to be employable. This is what “competencies” means today: they are 
the “outcome of learning and the input for the labor market and society” (p. 401). The 
state is able to withdraw from the management of society and any responsibilities toward 
the collective because there is no more collective; there is only an agglomeration of 
individual entrepreneurial selves who are free to learn and relearn, and who are solely 
responsible for their own lot in life. 
Bringing Giorgio Agamben into the conversation, Lewis (2013) has identified the 
notion of potentiality at the center of neoliberal capitalism and as that which drives 
neoliberalism’s logic of learning. Potentiality can be broken down into two types: generic 
and effective. Generic potentiality is the common meaning potentiality takes on, in which 
potentiality is the passage from potentiality to actuality, from the state of “I can” to the 
act of doing or being. Neoliberal capitalism and its logic of learning are “anchored in an 
ontology of generic potentiality as a ‘not yet’ that ‘must be’ made manifest in measurably 
determinate, socially useful, and economically manageable skill sets” (p. 6). Learning is 
defined by the achievement of a pre-determined end, which is why learning is always 
measureable and testable. Benchmarks are then established to chart one’s progress along 
the way to a learning outcome, objective, or goal. 
The irony of generic potentiality is that through the passage to actuality 
potentiality is destroyed: one is no longer in potential, one no longer can but is. Thus, we 
arrive at the other form of potential: effective potentiality, or potentiality freed from the 
actualization imperative. Effective potentiality is, therefore, the potential to be and not to 
be, to do and not to do. Whereas generic potentiality is a potentiality in relationship to a 
particular thing or act, effective potentiality as the potentiality to not-be is “a potentiality 
that has as its object potentiality itself” (Agamben, 1993/2007, p. 36). Potential is not 
actualized but preserved and held within itself. Potential stays impotential. 
Agamben sees these two types of potentiality as radically separate, and in doing 
so, Lewis (2013), contends, he “takes for granted the existence of in-capabilities and 
propensities as the necessary background for the appearance of capabilities. He assumes 
that one can” (p. 45). Lewis, in turn, asserts a sort of dialectical relationship between 
them, which is why he writes of im-potentiality. To be im-potential is to be able to be and 
to be able to not be simultaneously, to experience potential freed from any predetermined 
category or identity. The learning society eliminates im-potential because it is “obsessed 
with the measure of what someone can do on order to fulfill a particular role within the 
economy,” and this obsession with “assessment and verification of actualization is… a 
form of evil that destroys the students’ freedom to not be” (Lewis, 2011, pp. 588-589). 
True freedom, that is, is not the freedom to be this or that, but the freedom to be or to not 
be this or that, and thus the freedom to be or to not be something else altogether. 
Neoliberalism forecloses this freedom, it can’t tolerate it because it disrupts the demand 
for performativity and efficiency. Thus, Lewis looks to the freedom of im-potentiality to 
develop an alternative educational logic to learning: the logic(s) of studying. 
Whereas learning is always concerned with and determined by ends (learning 
goals, outcomes, etc.), studying is about means: it is definitional of studying that when 
one engages in the act one does not have an end in mind. When one sets out to study 
there may be an end in sight (a dissertation or a book, or a piece of information or a 
theoretical development), but as one begins to study the end retreats. As Lewis (2014) 
puts it, “The studier prefers not to engage in self-actualization… constantly moving 
forward toward some kind of indeterminate goal while simultaneously withdrawing from 
the very idea of goals in the first place” (p. 164). When we wander in the archives, or 
when we follow link after link after link on the internet until we end up watching obscure 
YouTube videos, the ends of our project are distanced or, more accurately, they are 
suspended. In the learning society, such wandering is interpreted as procrastination. We 
tend of think of what is actually studying as getting distracted and sidetracked. The state 
of impotential has to be overcome as quickly as possible, and anything that interferes 
with this process is a hinderance. This interpretation follows directly from the obsession 
with actualizing potential and from the demand that learning contribute directly and 
immediately to the functioning of capitalism and to self-actualization. 
Studying can’t be properly said to “produce” works, for while studying surely 
contributes to a product, its contributions can’t be delineated in any coherent way. Even 
with hindsight studying resists strict signification. Studying instead leaves “traces,” and 
Lewis identifies three of these traces that shed light on the logic of study. First, when 
studying one “prefers not to.” “When deep in study and someone asks, ‘so what have you 
found out?’ or ‘so what is your stance on x?,’ the studier prefers not to say, thus 
withholding conclusions” (p. 164). It is not that the studier will not say, in which case 
they would possess determinate knowledge that they refuse to share, and it is not that the 
studier cannot say, in which case they would lack any potential answer. Instead, the 
studier both can and cannot say. Second, studying takes place within the “no longer, not 
yet.” When studying one is no longer ignorant but is not yet a master. Studying pushes 
toward and withdraws from the command of knowledge. Third, studying is organized 
around the “as not.” While learning about an object or idea we engage that object or idea 
as it is, but while studying and object or idea we engage it as not. Lewis gives the 
example of studying a car engine by taking it apart. This act is indistinguishable from a 
mechanic taking apart a car engine for a certain goal and purpose. What distinguishes the 
two engagements with the engine is the fact that the studier of the engine engages the 
engine as not an engine. This frees the object up for unforeseen and unforeseeable uses; 
activities are divorced from predetermined purposes, and signs from predetermined 
significations. 
Studying, it’s important to note, is not necessarily the opposite of learning. 
“Studying,” Lewis (2013) writes, “suspends ends yet does not retreat into pure 
potentiality. It is the ambiguous state of recessive sway that holds within itself this and 
that without choosing either” (p. 147). Again, Lewis’ critique of Agamben is that he 
doesn’t take into account the fact that learning is, in many ways, a presupposition to the 
act of study in that to be im-potential requires. Studying opens up what has been learned 
to the possibility of being otherwise, opening up ellipses within the learning society that 
can be stretched to render it inoperative. 
 
Crowd study and the beautiful moment 
 
Learning orders students according to existing identities and capabilities, grading them 
according to their ability to actualize sets of skills, knowlegdges, habits, and so on. 
Learners are graded and ranked, their ability to conform to predetermined commands is 
evaluated, and these evaluations subjectify the learner to corresponding economic, social, 
and political roles. Not everyone’s potential is invested in, of course. Many are victims of 
quite violent disinvestment. One set of learners “can” and another set “cannot.” The first 
set are tasked with becoming self-entrepreneurs, constantly learning and relearning to 
meet the constantly shifting global market society, and the latter set are subject variously 
to abandonment and repression. Studying interrupts the demand to actualize potential by 
introducing a hyphen in between potential and impotential, so that the slogan of the 
studier becomes “I can… I cannot.” Studying is antagonistic to the learning regime and 
the neoliberal production relations it reproduces because it is incommensurable with the 
latter’s obsession with ends and measurability. While studying one prefers not to be this 
or that category, this or that kind of worker, and capital accumulation and social progress 
are thrown into crisis. 
One of the most important things that Lewis’ theory of study does is reveal that 
education is not a subset of or subservient to politics and economics. His work helps us 
understand that forms of educational life do not follow from, but lie at the heart of, 
politics. Yet while studying is antagonistic to capitalism and its learning society, the 
manner in which this educational logic becomes a political force is underdeveloped at 
best, and debilitating at worst. To make this argument, I want to turn to the recent work 
of political and cultural theorist Jodi Dean, and in particular her book Crowds and Party. 
While Dean doesn’t address education, learning, or studying, her insights nonetheless 
have important implications for the matter at hand, for not only revealing the limitations 
of studying as it has so far been theorized but, more importantly, for making studying 
into a political force. 
Toward the end of her 2012 book, The Communist Horizon, Dean (2012) noted 
that “our political problem differs in a fundamental way from that of communists at the 
beginning of the twentieth century-we have to organize individuals; they had to organize 
masses” (196). Her new book begins here, with a theoretical and historical examination 
of this contemporary subject of politics: the individual. The individual subject-form 
leaves revolutionary politics fragmented and isolated, moving from local reform to local 
reform without articulating any grand vision. The prominence of individuality results 
from an assault on collectivity. One of the strange ways in which we embrace this assault 
is when we turn to "do-it-yourself" politics, which, Dean (2016) writes, “is so unceasing 
that ‘taking care of oneself’ appears as politically significant instead of a symptom of 
collective failure—we let the social safety new unravel—and economic contraction—in a 
viciously competitive job market we have no choice but to work on ourselves, constantly, 
just to keep up” (p. 31). Dean sets out to reclaim this collectivity.  
She begins by reading Althusser’s famous thesis on interpellation backwards, 
standing it right-side up. In Althusser’s formulation, ideology interpellates individuals as 
subjects. He gives the example of a police officer shouting, “Hey, you there!” When one 
turns around in response to the hail, one is subjectified. Although, as Althusser repeatedly 
clarifies, one is always-already a subject. Even before one enters the world they are 
enmeshed within the familial, medical, legal, and other ideological apparatuses. Dean, on 
the contrary, contends that instead of interpellating the individual as a subject, ideology 
interpellates the subject as an individual. Rephrasing one of Althusser’s arguments, she 
writes, “What do children learn in school? They learn that they are individuals” (p. 85).  
Viewing interpellation as an act of individuation poses the individual subject-form as a 
problem, as the result “of the enclosure of the common in never-ceasing efforts to repress, 
deny, and foreclose collective political subjectivity… Rather than natural or given, the 
individual form encloses into a singular bounded body collective bodies, ideas, affects, 
desires, and drives” (p. 80).  
When we are individuated we are separated from collectivity, isolated, trapped in 
our fictional egos. Individuation, however, never works smoothly or totally, and the gaps 
created by its non-completion or consistent failure are where the subject is located. The 
gap is also the occasion of politics: “Political subjectivization involves forcing this non-
identity, making it felt as an effect of the subject” (p. 89). Dean refers to this as a split in 
the people, which includes not just the split between those who have and those who don’t, 
or between the included and excluded, but a split within the people’s consciousness, the 
ways in which we aren’t fully presentable, transparent, or accountable to ourselves. 
Individualization, that is, always fails, and the crowd seizes on and amplifies this failure, 
forcing the people into the realm of what Lewis calls im-potentiality, that place of limbo 
between subjectificaiton and desubjectification. Group dynamics and crowd theory are 
important here, and in particular Gustave Le Bon and Freud. Le Bon, a conservative 
racist who had nothing but contempt for the revolutionary crowds in the industrial centers 
of the 19th century, identifies four key characteristics of the crowd: “contagion, 
suggestion, affective intensification, and de-individualization” (p. 95). Freud, for his part, 
appropriated crowd theory and Le Bon’s work to argue that the crowd is “a source of new 
feelings, thoughts, and ideas” as well as “the novel consistency of a provisional being” (p. 
100). To put it through two of Lewis’ traces of study, we could say that in the crowd we 
experience ourselves as no longer ourselves but not quite an other self, and that we 
experience ourselves as not ourselves. 
The no longer, not yet and as not of the crowd can bring into being what Elias 
Canetti called the crowd’s egalitarian discharge. The density of beings in place ordains 
this libidinal excess, which liberates subjectivity from the individual subject form. The 
equality of the crowd’s egalitarian discharge is thus not the equality of disparate 
individuals, but an equality flowing from the dissolution of the boundaries of the 
interpellated individual. The libidinal feeling of the egalitarian release enacts the affective 
dynamics of the crowd. Specifically, the desire of the crowd is to increase, expand, and 
endure, and it will do these things so long as it has a goal. “Direction,” as Dean writes, 
“intensifies equality by providing a common goal. If the crowd is to continue to exist, the 
goal must remain unattained. Expressed in Lacanian terms: desire is a desire to desire” 
(pp. 122-123). This direction, of course, need not be explicit. In actuality, the direction of 
the crowd is usually quite uncertain. Quite often the direction of the crowd is formulated 
negatively, as an expression of anger and a desire to move away from some system, 
event, structure, etc. The crowd emerges from within the gap of subjectivity, engaging us 
in a process of joyful disindividuation that takes the form of an intense belonging. This 
discharge, in turn, pushes us to want more, and it enables us to experience the force of 
collectivity, accomplishing what we could not accomplish as single or even as aggregated 
individuals. 
The crowd experience of collectivity and equality is enamoring. Resisting and 
breaking free from the enclosure of subjectivity and feeling the jouissance of desire can 
feel like liberation. Some radical activists—Dean specifically calls out “autonomists, 
insurrectionists, anarchists, and libertarian communists” (p. 125)—organize to achieve 
precisely this “beautiful moment,” and their political program revolves around sustaining 
the beautiful moment. This is not just a dangerous mistake, but a complete dead end, for 
the crowd is not political. Rather, the crowd offers an opening for politics by installing a 
gap in the order of things. 
Here, it might be helpful to bring in another one of Althusser’s (2006) ideas: the 
materialism of the encounter. Althusser begins his brilliant treatise simply: “It is raining,” 
he writes. “Let this book therefore be, before all else, a book about ordinary rain” (p. 167). 
In the ordinary rain Althusser sees Epicurus’ atoms flying parallel until there is what 
Epicurus called a clinamen, or swerve. With this swerve, atoms encounter other atoms, 
and the possibility of the new is produced. Yet it is only the possibility of the new, for the 
encounter, as Althusser insists, has to take hold, has to endure and persist. Generation 
takes place when the encounter is sustained, but there is nothing to guarantee whether or 
not an encounter will take place, whether or not it will hold, and in what direction it will 
go if it indeed does take hold. The encounter can thus take place, take hold, and take off. 
The sustained encounter and its results are always a bit of a surprise, which “is what 
strikes everyone so forcefully during the great commencements, turns or suspensions of 
history… when the dice are, as it were, thrown back on the table unexpectedly” (p. 196). 
In the crowd, people encounter one another, and as the boundaries between them dissolve, 
as subjectivity resists and escapes enclosure, the chance opens for new political 
arrangements and production relations. Yet, as Dean (2016) exhorts, this politics—this 
beautiful moment of encounter—isn’t really politics, for “Politics combines the opening 
with direction, with the insertion of the crowd disruption into a sequence or process that 
pushes one way rather than another” (p. 125). The beautiful moment is when the 
encounter takes place, but what will ensure that the encounter will take hold and that it 
will take off in the right—or better, left—direction. Without paying attention to the 
matter of organization and affirmative direction, the crowd and its educational logic can 
be reabsorbed into the circuits of capitalist valorization, or worse, can work to strengthen 
the rule of capital. This brings us to the political limits of studying. 
 
The political limits to studying 
 
Studying is, like the crowd event, a beautiful moment of encounter, the opening up of the 
possible, the breeding ground of the new. While studying one is disindivuated, swaying 
between subjectification and desubjectification, between being this and being that. The 
studier resists classification, preferring not to actualize any predicate. And like the crowd 
event, I contend, studying isn’t politics, it is only the occasion for politics, a necessary 
but insufficient educational logic for the struggle against capitalist production relations 
and for the common. Without something more, studying can retreat from impotentiality 
into impotence, and, on the other hand, it can be actualized into something reactionary. 
To illustrate these possibilities, I will turn to two examples.  
The first example is of studying as hacking, when one takes some thing or process, 
enters into and disrupts it. Hacking is an intervention that directs something toward other 
ends and uses, detaching it from its attachments to other objects and processes, 
potentially opening it up to the unforeseen and unforeseeable. In this way, hacking is a 
transgression and the hacker is an outlaw, one who literally lives by transgressing the 
lawful order that dictates propriety (who can do what with what). Lewis and Friedrich 
(2016) bring up the Anonymous collective, which has “repurposed websites and servers 
to expose particular contradictions and injustices in the capitalist system” (p. 244). Not 
only their actions, but Anonymous’ very mode of organization is subversive in that 
anyone can join. Membership in the collective is not predicated upon any particular 
identity or a commitment to a specific end. Anonymous are “pirates who steal back 
private code for common use, and in this sense open up the world of code to 
unanticipated mutations” (ibid.). One of Anonymous’ first major actions was a swarm 
attack on the Church of Scientology for their efforts to censor online criticism of the 
Church. In addition to sending all-black faxes to their fax machines (to use up ink), 
Anonymous members coordinated a Google bomb attack by linking “scientology” to a 
host of other words, like “dangerous” and “cult,” to influence (redirect) any Google 
searches for scientology. Through distributed denial-of-service attacks, in which multiple 
computers the infrastructure of root nameservers, Anonymous hackers have shut down a 
host of websites, from the Department of Justice (in response to the DoJ’s takedown of a 
file-sharing network) to the International Association of Chiefs of Police (as part of a 
national day of action against police brutality). 
While hacking is indeed a reappropriation of code and a repurposing of the 
networked infrastructure of contemporary capitalism, there is nothing inherently 
revolutionary about hacking. For as many Anonymous actions that have supported 
revolutionary political movements, there have been others that have arguably hindered 
such movements. Consider Anonymous’ intervention in the “Arab Spring” uprisings as a 
case in point. Anonymous sought to support the uprisings by attacking government 
websites and publicizing the private information of government officials who were 
opposing or repressing the protests. Yet in addition to attacking the governments of Egypt 
and Tunisia, which were indeed repressing popular revolts, Anonymous also attacked the 
government of Syria, which was battling a range of forces, including those associated 
with al-Qaeda and its splinter group, Daesh, or the Islamic State in Syria. The situation in 
Syria was much different than in Egypt or Tunisia, as the government retained popular 
support and immediately engaged in a series of serious reforms, including the drafting of 
an entirely new constitution (see Glazebrook, 2013). Indeed, it could be said that in Syria 
the government was the progressive force. Or consider a spin-off of Anonymous, Ghost 
Squad, which shut down the official website of the Loyal White Knights of the Ku Klux 
Klan and the next week attacked the website of Black Lives Matter (before tweeting, “All 
lives matter!”).  Regardless of one’s position on these issues, conflicts, nation-states, and 
so on, it is clear from these few examples that hacking doesn’t have a politics and that, as 
an act of studying, it is not inherently against capitalist production relations. 
The second example that I turn to here is meant to illustrate the potential apolitical 
impotence of studying, and it brings us more directly into conversation with Dean. In the 
last chapter of Lewis’ (2013) On Study, he turns to the early stages of the Occupy Wall 
Street movement to articulate the “im-potential political dimension to studying” (p. 150). 
Lewis celebrates the beginning stage of Occupy Wall Street as a form of collective, 
public studying, especially in its absence of concrete demands. While the mainstream 
press and politicians were anxious to hear what the protesters were demanding so they 
could issue a response accordingly, the occupation “spent most of its time preferring not 
to commit to any one demand over and above any other” (p. 152). Rather than actualize 
political polemics and demands, articulating them into proposals that could then be 
evaluated, occupiers produced a rupture within the received order of political struggle. 
The occupation actively resisted the drive to achieve results and instead conducted an 
ongoing study of politics, suspending the pursuit of measureable outcomes; engaging in 
protest as not protest. As a result, efforts to grade Occupy falter, for there were no pre-
established criteria with which to evaluate it. 
Occupy celebrated horizontalism, leaderlessness, inclusivity, and the absence of 
hierarchical structures. Neither an undifferentiated mass nor an agglomeration of 
individuals, the occupiers formed a  
 
state of exception where dichotomies and divisions were left idle, the homeless 
the middle class, and a host of other intermediary grounds (including students) 
met in an atopic space and time to study the sublime art of discussing across 
differences and living across class divisions. What emerged was precisely the 
question (and not the answer) of inclusion and exclusion facing not only OWS but 
the contemporary learning society as such. (p. 159) 
 
This state of exception was exemplified in the slogan, “We are the 99%!” The 99% was a 
kind of non-identity, “a totally generic yet absolutely irreducible singularity” (p. 157), as 
Lewis puts it. “We are the 99%!” took a quantity and transformed it into an indefinable 
quality, a way of grouping people without resorting to predicates and already-established 
identities. Just precisely who the 99% were (or are), was never fully delineated, couldn’t 
quite be accounted for. The question was left open for collective study. 
 A major problem with this ongoing collective study, however, is that there was 
nothing to defend it or to sustain it. Capital and its state weren’t studying, but were rather 
gearing up to unleash a wave of repression that would eventually undo the occupation. 
The Partnership for Civil Justice Fund has released several sets of documents obtained 
through Freedom of Information Act requests that detail the dense network of 
surveillance and repressive efforts that included offices of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, the New York Stock Exchange, the 
Federal Reserve, universities and colleges, major corporations, local police forces, and 
local governments, as well as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and the U.S. 
Marshals Service (Partnership for Civil Justice Fund 2012; 2016). In this case, repression 
opened the door to reabsorption, as many Occupiers entered to non-profit industrial 
complex, or even started their own business ventures to profit from their activism. 
Occupying and hacking represent study as embryonic political praxis, the 
enactment of educational logics that are potentially antagonistic to capitalist production 
relations and capital’s logic of learning. Whereas capitalism demands that everything—
even that which opposes it—be actualized so that it can be subsumed within its circuits of 
productivity, occupying and hacking interrupt this seemingly ceaseless process, opening 
up the world and subjectivity to the possibility of being otherwise than. Studying is 
therefore, I proffer, the educational activity of the crowd, a way to pedagogically bring 
forth the beautiful moment. This is a crucial element of struggle but, as Dean insists, it 
isn’t properly a politics; it is merely an opening for politics. Writing again explicitly 
about political movements, Dean (2016) writes: 
 
The beautiful in-between of infinite potentiality can’t last forever. People get tired. 
Some want a little predictability, reliable food sources, shelter, and medical care. 
Others realize their doing all the work… The crowd isn’t an alternative political 
arrangement; it’s the opening to a process of re-arrangement. (p. 142) 
 
The question, then, is how to seize upon this opening and carry it forward into a real 
revolutionary movement. How, in other words, to make the encounter take hold, how to 
make it take off in a desirable direction? These are questions that, while they should 
always be open to study, have to be answered, at least provisionally and contingently. Or 
else the market and its advertising agencies will come knocking with an endless list of 
glossy, high-definition answers. Or, alternatively, the state will come knocking down 
doors, guns drawn and handcuffs aplenty. The encounter won’t take hold and the 
possibility of the new will be foreclosed as the crowd is dispersed through redirection, 
exhaustion, or repression. 
 
Studying like a communist 
 
We already have an answer—or, perhaps, the beginnings of an answer—to these 
questions: the organizational form of the Party. The crowd craves affirmative direction 
and it wants to persist, to spread, to keep the gap within the order of things open. This is 
precisely what the Party does. Hence, Dean proposes that the primary role of the Party is 
not that of the prophet, director, or master. Instead of providing answers and directions, 
the Party is, more than anything else, a type of affective infrastructure that maintains the 
gap of desire and, I would add, that sustains the practice of study. 
 To make this claim, Dean turns to the history of communist parties not where they 
were strongest—like in the Soviet Union or the People’s Republic of China—but where 
they were weakest: the U.S. and Britain. In particular, she turns to Vivian Gornick’s 
(1977) beautiful book about the experience of former members of the Communist Party 
of the USA, The Romance of American Communism. The book paints a portrait of the 
CPUSA as an apparatus that generated feelings of imagination and possibility, as an 
institutional configuration that, in the direst of circumstances, “held open a gap in the 
given through which people could see themselves in collective struggle changing the 
world” (Dean, 2016, p. 220). From the larger tasks (organizing workers and the 
unemployed, protests, campaigns, and jail support), to the seemingly smaller tasks 
(canvassing neighborhoods, organizing, facilitating and attending local meetings, selling 
newspapers, making and distributing leaflets, raising funds), all Party work was not just 
filled with a sense of purpose, immediacy, and enthusiasm, but served to generate these 
feelings. As Dean puts it, “It wasn’t the vision that sustained the activity. The activity 
was the practical optimism that sustained the vision” (p. 228).  
Stated differently, it wasn’t that the Party’s vision was out there, something 
external that had to be attained. Instead, the vision was internal, traversing the subject 
and the collective. As Paul Levinson, who was raised in a New York City housing project 
dominated by Communists in the early 20th century, says: 
 
…it was alive. Intense, absorbing, filled with a kind of comradeship I never 
against expect to know. In those basement clubrooms in The Coops, talking late 
into the night, every night for years, we literally felt we were making history. Do 
you know what I mean when I say that? We felt that what we thought and spoke 
and decided upon in those basement rooms in the Bronx was going to have an 
important effect on the entire world out there. (Gornick, 1977, p. 56) 
 
The gap that the Party held open made it possible for members to study, to live within a 
world no longer bourgeois but not yet communist, to transform routine activities (talking, 
writing) into something profound and earthshaking. The world was not just thought of in 
these terms, it was experienced in them. 
 The Party perspective, then, was two-fold. On the one hand, there was class-
consciousness, a learning of the tendencies and laws of capital accumulation and the 
dynamics of imperialism, racism, and national oppression. On the other hand, however, 
was an affective intensity that things can be otherwise and that this otherwise is already 
present, already germinating. “The perspective,” Dean (2016) says, “is like a law, the law 
enabling communist desire, setting it apart from the capitalist world by holding up and 
uniting the experiences of the oppressed.” This law isn’t external, however: “It’s a law 
communist give themselves in order to hold themselves together when everything 
conspires to pull them apart—police repression, fear and paranoia, individual desire and 
need” (p. 243). 
 The only trace of study that seems to be absent in the Party is that of preferring 
not. After all, the perspective of the party is proletarian, and its members emphatically 
embrace and occupy this identity category. I want to propose that the Party occupies a 
contradictory position in relation to preferring not. On the one hand, preferring not is a 
fundamental feature of the crowd from which it emerges. This is most evident in the 
crowd’s desire to desire, the requirement that the crowd’s wish be forever unfulfilled. 
The crowd wants to endure, and this endurance depends, in part, upon its unmet desire. 
Here, Lewis provides the Party with a preparatory pedagogy, for the act of preferring not 
is, in lieu or in addition to the crowd event, what helps the student imagine the world 
beyond capitalism. Yet on the other hand, the Party serves to orient the crowd, giving it 
direction, ensuring that it doesn’t get reabsorbed into the circuits of capital or redirected 
toward reactionary ends. It may be the case that the Party is forced to disavow its origins. 
This is a question that I leave open for further study. 
 When engaging in political dialogue and action, it is not uncommon to hear 
educational terms thrown around. We talk about testing our ideas in practice and about 
learning from our history. We form study groups. We question and revise our methods of 
facilitating meetings and of interacting with others. Politics is deeply educational. At the 
same time, the educational components of political movement building are rarely 
investigated in any rigorous manner. One of the most important contributions that 
educational philosophy can offer radical politics is this investigation. We can develop the 
tools, concepts, frameworks, and languages with which to understand contemporary 
political educational processes, and with which to construct and enact alternative and 
oppositional processes. In order to do this, however, we ourselves have to take up the 
perspective of the Party, the dual commitment to the proletarian position and to holding 
open the gap in the order of things. 
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1 Most educational literature refers to “neoliberalism” or “neoliberal capitalism.” While 
there is some value in this term, I prefer to speak of capitalism for three related reasons. 
First, there is a tendency to write about neoliberalism without explaining what 
neoliberalism is, which can lead to a good deal of confusion and misunderstanding. 
Second, neoliberalism must always be seen as a particular manifestation of capitalism. 
                                                                                                                                                 
And third, neoliberalism is but one facet of the contemporary capitalist order, and paying 
exclusive attention to it distracts us from the broader picture (see Malott & Ford, 2015). 
When drawing on particular authors, however, I honor their word choice. 
